Administrative Law and Culture for the U.S. Collaborative Governance State by Rosenbloomn, David H. & Hung, Mei Jen
Journal of Dispute Resolution 
Volume 2009 Issue 2 Article 3 
2009 
Administrative Law and Culture for the U.S. Collaborative 
Governance State 
David H. Rosenbloomn 
Mei Jen Hung 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/jdr 
 Part of the Dispute Resolution and Arbitration Commons 
Recommended Citation 
David H. Rosenbloomn and Mei Jen Hung, Administrative Law and Culture for the U.S. Collaborative 
Governance State, 2009 J. Disp. Resol. (2009) 
Available at: https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/jdr/vol2009/iss2/3 
This Conference is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at University of Missouri School of 
Law Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Journal of Dispute Resolution by an authorized 
editor of University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact 
bassettcw@missouri.edu. 
Administrative Law and Culture for
the U.S. Collaborative Governance
State
David H. Rosenbloom* and Mei Jen Hung**
During the 1980s and 1990s, collaborative governance emerged as a poten-
tially new global paradigm for public administration. It comes in many forms.
However, its essence is governmental reliance on nongovernmental entities for the
delivery of public services and constraints. Simply put, collaborative governance
calls on government to focus on "steering" while relying on third parties to do the
"rowing." In the United States, collaborative government is not new in kind-the
federal government relied on contractors to convey the mail from the early days of
the republic. Rather it is new in scope, accounting for billions of dollars and mil-
lions of contract employees. As with any major shift in public administration,
collaborative governance challenges extant legal regimes and organizational cul-
tures. This article explains these challenges and considers some of the changes
necessary to integrate collaborative government more fully into U.S. constitution-
al democracy.
I. ORIGINS
The movement toward collaborative governance as a new public administra-
tive paradigm in the United States can be conveniently dated to publication of E.S.
Savas' book, Privatization: The Key to Better Government in 1987. Savas main-
tained that "the role of government is to steer, not to man the oars" and that using
third parties to row "helps restore government to its fundamental purpose."' He
took a broad view of what government could rely on nongovernmental entities to
provide. Among such functions, he lists adoption; airport operation; child protec-
tion; crime laboratory work; crime prevention and patrol; economic development;
election administration; housing inspection and code enforcement; public housing
management; criminal justice probation; property acquisition; public relations and
information services; and records management.2 Savas also identified several of
the tools government can use in collaborative governance: contracts, franchises,
grants, vouchers, volunteers, coproduction by the public, and regulatory measures.
It is a moot point whether Savas was ahead of the practice or placed it in a
conceptual framework. By 1989, collaborative governance was firmly entrenched
in some federal agencies. At the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA):
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1. EMANUEL S. SAVAS, PRIVATIZATION: THE KEY TO BETTER GOVERNMENT 290 (1987).
2. Id. at 73.
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Consultants were analyzing proposed legislation, drafting EPA's budget
documents, overseeing the agency's field investigation teams, preparing
work statements for other EPA contracts, writing draft preambles to for-
mal rules, responding to public comments on those rules as part of the
formal rulemaking process, developing guidelines for monitoring other
contractors, organizing and conducting public hearings, and advising se-
nior officials on legislative reorganizations .... 3
Similarly, the Department of Energy:
relie[d] on a private workforce to perform virtually all basic governmen-
tal functions. It relie[d] on contractors in the preparation of its most im-
portant plans and policies, the development of budgets and budget docu-
ments, and the drafting of reports to Congress and congressional testimo-
ny. It relie[d] on contractors to monitor arms control negotiations, help
prepare decisions on the export of nuclear technology, and conduct hear-
ings and initial appeals in challenges to security clearance disputes. In
addition, a contractor workforce is relied on by the Inspector General.4
Senator David Pryor (Democrat, Arkansas) denounced such arrangements
creating "a very large, invisible, unelected bureaucracy of consultants who
perform an enormous portion of the basic work of and set the policy for the Gov-
ernment."
5
Building on Savas' work and further stamping collaborative government as
among public administration's best practices, David Osborne and Ted Gaebler's
phenomenally popular Reinventing Government laid the groundwork for the
Clinton-Gore administration's effort to reinvent the federal government.
6
Although the reinvention effort led by the Clinton-Gore National Performance
Review went well beyond collaborative government by calling for massive
deregulation of public administration, it repeated the "steering/rowing" metaphor
and promoted massive outsourcing of governmental work.7  The National
Performance Review developed the following decision tree for determining what
the federal government should do:
3. PAUL LIGHT, THE TRUE SIZE OF GOVERNMENT 14 (1999). Light may be using "formal" in the
sense of formalized or institutionalized and referring to notice-and-comment rulemaking perhaps as
well as formal rulemaking.
4. Daniel Guttman, Public Purpose and Private Service: The Twentieth Century Culture of Con-
tracting Out and the Evolving Law of Diffused Sovereignty, 52 ADMIN. L. REV. 859, 873 (2000) (quot-
ing Use of Consultants and Contractors by the Environmental Protection Agency and the Department
of Energy: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Fed. Servs., Post Office, and Civil Serv. of the Senate
Comm. on Governmental Affairs, 101st Cong. 63 (1989)).
5. LIGHT, supra note 3, at 13.
6. DAVID OSBORNE & TED GAEBLER, REINVENTING GOVERNMENT (1992). This book offered a
new paradigm for public administration, known as "reinvention," and was among the most influential
in field in the 1990s. Osborne was a senior advisor to Vice President Al Gore on the National Perfor-
mance Review. Gaebler has been an appointed government official in several states, including Califor-
nia, Oregon, Ohio, Maryland, and Pennsylvania. Osborne and Gaebler are both members of the Na-
tional Academy of Public Administration.
7. AL GORE, CREATING A GOVERNMENT THAT WORKS BETTER & COSTS LESS: THE REPORT OF
THE NATIONAL PERFORMANCE REVIEW 7 (1993).
[Vol. 2009
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1. If a federal program is not "based on customer input," it should be
terminated or privatized.
2. If a federal program is "based on customer input," the question is
whether it "can . . . be done as well or better at the state or local
level."
3. If thie answer is yes, then it should "devolve to other governments."
4. If the answer is no, then the issue is whether there is "any way to cut
cost or improve performance by introducing competition."
5. If the answer is yes, then the program should be privatized or
franchised.
6. If the answer is no, then it should be retained by the government and
reinvented, which might also involve contracting out some of its
aspects.
8
The number of private employees under contract with the federal government
at the close of the Clinton-Gore administration is unknown, but certainly large.
Paul Light estimated the number at 5,635,000 in 1996. 9 In some agencies,
collaborative government was clearly the norm. For example, in 2001, the
Department of Energy "reported that it had 14,700 employees (civil servants and
officials), and over 100,000 contractor employees."'' 0
President George W. Bush's administration was also firmly committed to col-
laborative governance. During the 2000 presidential election campaign, Bush
echoed the National Performance Review: "My policies and my vision of
government reform are guided by three principles: government should be
citizen-centered, results-oriented, and wherever possible, market-based."'" Bush
called for "competitive sourcing" in his President's Management Agenda, issued
in the summer of 2001 .12 Subsequently, the U.S. Office of Management and
Budget (OMB) restructured outsourcing to enable federal employees to compete
on paper with potential contractors for the performance of federal work. As
outlined in OMB's Circular A-76, competitive sourcing is complex, involving a
8. NATIONAL PERFORMANCE REVIEW, REINVENTION ROUNDTABLE: THE REPORT OF THE
NATIONAL PERFORMANCE REVIEW (1995); see also Stephen Barr, Gore Urges Rethinking for Reinven-
tion, WASH. POST, Jan. 4, 1995, at A23.
9. LIGHT, supra note 3, at 38.
10. Dan Guttman, Inherently Governmental Functions and the New Millennium, in MAKING
GOVERNMENT MANAGEABLE 51 (Thomas Stanton & Benjamin Ginsberg, eds., 2004).
11. George W. Bush, Building a Responsive, Innovative Government, FED. TIMES, June 26, 2000, at
15.
12. OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, THE PRESIDENT'S
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variety of officials, teams, and boards. 13 It potentially improves government effi-
ciency as federal employees reengineer their work to be competitive. Ultimately,
competitive sourcing decisions depend very heavily on cost-effectiveness, with
pay, benefits, insurance, contract administration, overhead, retirement, and related
considerations taken into account. 14 As of 2003, OMB identified some 434,800
federal positions suitable for competitive outsourcing.
15
The effectiveness and desirability of collaborative governance came under
substantial questioning by the end of the Bush administration. As discussed, in-
fra, a disquieting feature of collaboration is that the administrative law regime,
largely based on the Administrative Procedure Act of 1946 (APA), 16 that regulates
federal agencies has very limited application to contractors and other nonfederal
third parties. 17 The Abu Ghraib scandal in 2004, which involved military and
contract employees while highlighting the unclear relationship between the two,
cast outsourcing in a highly unfavorable light.18 In Abu Ghraib as generally, it
appeared that accountability had suffered and that the government was unable
adequately to monitor contracting and contractors.
Over the years, the media have highlighted several instances of contractor
corruption and inadequate performance. In February 2009, the U.S. Government
Accountability Office (GAO) issued a report indicating that the federal "Excluded
Parties List System," which requires prohibiting corrupt contractors from receiv-
ing additional contracts, was not working well. Having promised change and to
fix government in his election campaign, in March 2009, President Barack Obama
ordered OMB to undertake a thorough review of Circular A-76 and related com-
petitive sourcing matters. 20 Congress also had A-76 on its agenda. The Omnibus
Appropriations Act of 2009, signed by President Obama on March 11, suspended
a great deal of federal competitive sourcing.2 1 However, whether the federal gov-
erment can and will reverse or restrain collaborative governance in the long term
is an open question.
13. OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, OMB CIRCULAR No. A-76
(REVISED), PERFORMANCE OF COMMERCIAL ACTIVITIES (2003), available at http://oam.ocs.doc.gov/
docs/OMB%20Circular%20A-76%2ORevised%202003.pdf.
14. For a more complete discussion, see David Rosenbloom & Suzanne Piotrowski, Outsourcing the
Constitution and Administrative Law Norms, 35 AM. REV. OF PUB. ADMIN. 103 (2005).
15. OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, COMPETITIVE SOURCING:
REASONED AND RESPONSIBLE PUBLIC-PRIVATE COMPETITION 10, tbl.1 (2003), available at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/procurement/compsourc-addendum.pdf. One hundred thirty-five
thousand and two hundred positions in the Department of Homeland Security were not included in this
analysis. Id.
16. Administrative Procedure Act of 1946, Pub. L. No. 79-404, 60 Stat. 237.5 (codified as amended
in scattered sections of 5 U.S.C.).
17. Rosenbloom & Piotrowski, supra note 14, at 103-121.
18. Vince Crawley & Bernard Adelsberger, Abu Ghraib Reports Fault Contracting, Leadership,
FED. TIMES, Aug. 30, 2004, at 12.
19. U.S. GOV'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, EXCLUDED PARTIES LIST SYSTEM: SUSPENDED AND
DEBARRED BUSINESSES AND INDIVIDUALS IMPROPERLY RECEIVE FEDERAL FUNDS, 2009, available at
http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d09174.pdf; Robert Brodsky, Government Continues To Provide Un-
ethical Contractors with Work, GAO Says, GOV'T EXECUTIVE, Feb. 26. 2009, available at
http://www.govexec.com/story-page.cfm?filepath=/dailyfed/0209/022609rb I .htm&oref=search.
20. Elizabeth Newell, Obama Orders Contracting Overhaul, GOV'T EXECUTIVE, March 4, 2009,
available at http://www.govexec.comdailyfed/0309/030409e1.htm.
21. The Omnibus Appropriations Act, Pub. L. No. 111-8, 123 Stat. 691.
[Vol. 2009
4
Journal of Dispute Resolution, Vol. 2009, Iss. 2 [2009], Art. 3
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/jdr/vol2009/iss2/3
Administrative Law and Culture
II. PURPOSES
Embracing Savas' claims, collaborative governance is typically presented as a
means of making government "better" or in the reinventers' terms, "work better22 , ,..
and cost less." "Better," of course, is subject to multiple meanings. One per-
son's administrative efficiency may be the denial of another's due process.23 Not
surprisingly, therefore, the rationales for relying on third parties vary and can be at
odds with one another:
Cost-effectiveness. Cost-effectiveness is a prime reason for contract-
ing out governmental work. Starting from the premise that it would
be absurd for government to produce its own pencils, paperclips, and
other products that are readily available in open, competitive mar-
kets, advocates of collaborative governance contend that government
can cost-effectively provide a wide range of services by procuring
their performance through competitive bidding among third parties.
If private firms can pick up more trash per dollar than government,
why not contract for their services? Similarly, if Correction Corpo-
ration of America -can run prisons more cost-effectively than the
Federal Bureau of Prisons, why not hire it to do so? If Blackwater
and Halliburton can provide security to facilities and food service to
troops in a war zone more cost-effectively than military personnel,
why not rely on them?
" Specialization, expertise, and capacity. Government may also rely
on third parties because they have greater capacity and expertise in
performing an aspect of government work or tasks the government
needs completed. Information technology (IT) is an example. Ex-
pense aside, it would be difficult for government to duplicate IT spe-
cialists' capacity and expertise because they gain a wide range of
experience by working in a variety of settings with different hard-
ware, software, applications, and organizational cultures.
" Subsidies. Collaborative governance can be a means of subsidizing
third parties. Subsidies are a longstanding vehicle for promoting
public policies. Federal procurement policies provide advantages
that help subsidize small businesses and enterprises owned by disad-
vantaged persons. President George W. Bush's faith-based initia-
tives made it easier for religious organizations to compete for federal
social service contracts-and funds.
24
" Circumvention of legal requirements. As discussed, infra, in the
United States, private entities contracted to perform government
22. See GORE, supra note 7.
23. Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 650 (1972); see generally HERBERT KAUFMAN, RED TAPE
(1977).
24. Exec. Order No. 13,199, 66 Fed. Reg. 8499 (January 29, 2001).
No. 2]
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work are typically free from the constitutional and administrative
law provisions that apply to public agencies. Consequently, colla-
borative government can be deliberately used to circumvent constitu-
tional protections of due process and other rights, as well as regula-
tions providing for transparency, representation, and public partici-
pation. Perhaps most important in this context is that the broad pa-
noply of constitutional rights that pertain to public-sector human re-
sources management-and raise costs-do not apply to the private
sector.25 This may make relying on a contractor workforce more at-
tractive than a governmental one. Collaboration may also enable
public agencies to achieve indirectly what they may be legally for-
bidden to do directly. For example, in 2006, the U.S. Department of
Defense (DOD) contracted with a private firm that subcontracted
with BeNow, Inc., to create a database as an aid in military recruit-
ment.26 The information sought of high school and college students
included "birth dates, Social Security numbers, ethnicity, grade-point
averages" and the students' curricula. DOD apparently authorized
the contractor to gain access to medical records, among other
sources.28 Any effort by DOD to create the database itself would
have potentially violated the Privacy Act of 1974.29
Politics. Where there is governance, there is politics. In the United
States, both the Republicans and Democrats purport to favor limiting
or reducing the size of government. Reining in government was par-
ticularly important to the Clinton-Gore administration's claim to be
"New Democrats." 30 New Democrats have to avoid the "tax and
spend liberal" label applied to old Democrats. They also have to dis-
tinguish themselves from Republicans, which they do by contending
that government can be a positive force in the economy and society.
25. YONG S. LEE & DAVID H. ROSENBLOOM, A REASONABLE PUBLIC SERVANT 155-227 (2005)
(discussing equal employment opportunity law as it pertains both to public and private employees).
Though Constitutional concerns may not be as prevalent in the private sector as they are in the public
sector, there may be statutory equivalents, such as civil rights laws.




29. Privacy Act of 1974, 5 U.S.C. § 552A (2006). The act limits the types of information federal
agencies may collect, provides individuals with a right to access to records on them, and requires
agencies to publish notices in the Federal Register explaining their record keeping systems and access,
storage, and disposal policies. See FEDERAL ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE SOURCEBOOK 813-825
(William Funk, et al., eds, 3d ed. 2000). In a letter to then-Secretary of Defense, Donald Rumsfeld, a
coalition of more than 100 groups charged that the program conflicted with the Privacy Act. David
Chu, Undersecretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness, admitted that a privacy notice should
have been issued before 2005, which was three years after the program began. See Jonathan Krim,
Recruitment Tool Targeted, WASH. POST, Oct. 18, 2005, available at http://www.washingtonpost.coml
wp-dynlcontentlarticlel2005/10/17/AR2005101701529.html. Reliance on private entities to collect
information for federal agencies also raises Fourth Amendment concerns. See Michael Isaac, Privatiz-
ing Surveillance: The Use of Data Mining in Federal Law Enforcement, 58 RUTGERS L. REV. 1057
(2006).
30. Jon F. Hale, The Making of the New Democrats, 110 POL. Sci. Q. 207, 207-32 (1995).
[Vol. 2009
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Putting these two considerations together requires that government
be a finely honed tool or, as Gore might have put it, a well-integrated
circuit. Reducing the size of the federal workforce was central to the
National Performance Review. It initially called for a reduction of
252,000 positions.31 By 1996, the size of the non-postal federal civi-
lian workforce was down by some 282,000 positions, or thirteen per-
cent.32 The New Democrats' strategy undoubtedly helped Clinton
and Gore parry Senator Bob Dole's tax-and-spend charge during the
1996 presidential election campaign. Of course, as is now well un-
derstood, while the number of federal employees was shrinking, the
government's contractor workforce was growing.
33
III. GENERIC CONCERNS ABOUT COLLABORATIVE GOVERNMENT:
INHERENTLY GOVERNMENTAL FUNCTIONS, LEGAL CONTROLS, AND
CORRUPTION
A. Inherently Governmental Functions
There is disagreement over how to treat and define inherently governmental
functions in collaborative governance. Savas contends that ". . . false alarms are
raised about privatizing services that are said to be 'inherently governmental': the
responsibility for providing the service can be retained by government, but the
government does not have to continue producing it." 34 Taking state and local
government into account, he appears to be correct. As Paul Light observes, "But
for a handful of functions dealing with national security and criminal justice, it is
not clear that there is a pure and inherently governmental function left today." 35
Others, including the Bush and Obama administrations, would limit competitive
sourcing to commercial functions, that is, activities that are not inherently go-
vernmental. Under Bush, OMB defined "inherently governmental" as:
activity that is so intimately related to the public interest as to mandate
performance by government personnel. These activities require the exer-
cise of substantial discretion in applying government authority or making
decisions for the government. Inherently governmental activities normal-
ly fall into two categories: the exercise of sovereign government authori-
ty or the establishment of procedures and processes related to the over-
sight of monetary transactions or entitlements.
36
Examples include:
31. See GORE, supra note 7.
32. See LIGHT, supra note 3, at 38.
33. Id.
34. SAVAS, supra note 1, at 62.
35. LIGHT, supra note 3, at 9-10.
36. OMB CIRCULAR No. A-76, supra note 13, at 5-6.
No. 21
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" "Binding the United States to take or not to take some action by con-
tract, policy, regulation, authorization, order, or otherwise";
" "Determining, protecting, and advancing economic, political, terri-
torial, property, or other interests by military or diplomatic action,
civil or criminal judicial proceedings, contract management, or oth-
erwise";
" "Significantly affecting the life, liberty, or property of private per-
sons";
" "Exerting ultimate control over the acquisition, use, or disposition of
"137United States property....
Noting that the cost of federal contracts rose from $71 billion in 2000 to $135
billion in 2008, Obama finds this definition inadequate: "the line between inhe-
rently governmental activities that should not be outsourced and commercial ac-
tivities that may be subject to private sector competition has been blurred and
inadequately defined. As a result, contractors may be performing inherently go-
vernmental functions." 38 He gave OMB the lead responsibility for the unenviable
task of formulating a better definition of inherently governmental-one which
presumably will require that the government retain more functions in-house.
39
B. Legal Controls
With limited exceptions, the panoply of constitutional and federal administra-
tive law controls that regulate government do not apply to entities doing out-
sourced government work. The Constitution applies directly to private action only
under two circumstances. First, the Thirteenth Amendment's proscription of sla-
very and involuntary servitude applies to private parties as well as government.40
Second, under the state-action doctrine, a private entity may be treated as govern-
mental for constitutional purposes. The key is whether the private action "may be
fairly treated as that of the State [i.e., government] itself.",41 But whether the key
will fit "is a matter of normative judgment, and the criteria lack rigid simplicity"
and "consistency."
42
In general, to be a state actor, a private entity must be one or more of the fol-
lowing:
37. Id. at 6.
38. Memorandum for the Heads of Executive Departments and Agencies, Government Contracting
(Mar. 4, 2009), available at http://www.govexec.com/pdfs/030409el.pdf. It is not indicated whether
the figures are for constant dollars.
39. Id.
40. Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409 (1968); see ALEXANDER TsEsIs, THE THIRTEENTH
AMENDMENT AND AMERICAN FREEDOM: A LEGAL HISTORY (2004); George Rutherglen, State Action
and the Thirteenth Amendment, 94 VA. L. REV. 1367 (2008).
41. Brentwood Acad. v. Tenn. Secondary Sch. Athletic Ass'n, 531 U.S. 288, 295 (2001).
42. Id.; Lebron v. Nat'l. R.R. Passenger Corp., 513 U.S. 374, 378 (1995).
[Vol. 2009
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" Engaged in a public function as defined by the judiciary;
" Controlled by a government;
" Engaged in joint participation with government;
" Entwined with government; or
" Empowered to use government's coercive power. 43
Being heavily funded and/or regulated by government will not alone turn a
private party into a state actor. Although collaborative governance will probably
transform an increasing number of private entities into state actors, the vast major-
ity of government contractors are not likely to be subject to constitutional con-
straints. After all, the state-action doctrine is fashioned to protect private autono-
my as well as individual constitutional rights."a Similarly, federal administrative
law has little bearing on private entities engaged in collaborative governance. Its
core provisions for making administrative processes comport more fully with U.S.
democratic constitutionalism apply only to government. When it was enacted in
1946, there was nothing in the APA 45 that would make government contractors
more representative, open to public participation, transparent, or procedurally fair
in their treatment of individuals. Subsequent statutes and regulations do bring
administrative law values into collaborative governance, but on an incremental
rather than comprehensive basis.
For instance, the Openness Promotes Effectiveness in our National Govern-
ment Act, known as the "OPEN Government Act of 2007," extends freedom of
information to "any information" held by a private entity "that would be an agen-
cy record ... when maintained by an agency" and to information kept by a con-
tractor "for the purposes of records management." 46 The National Defense Autho-
rization Act for Fiscal Year 2008 also contains provisions for increasing the trans-
parency of collaborative governance.47 Additionally, it mandates GAO reporting
on the "ethics programs of major defense contractors," ethics training, and the
protection of contractor-employees who report a "substantial violation of law
related to a contract" through hotlines or other channels. 48 The Federal Acquisi-
tion Regulation contains provisions for whistle-blower protection and the protec-
tion of personal privacy.49 As useful as such measures may be, the reality remains
that when government outsources work, constitutional constraints and administra-
tive law values are apt to be lost.
43. BrentwoodAcad., 531 U.S. at 296-298.
44. Nat'l Collegiate Athletic Ass'n v. Jerry Tarkanian, 488 U.S. 179, 191 (1988).
45. Administrative Procedure Act, supra note 16.
46. OPEN Government Act of 2007, 5 U.S.C. § 552(f)(2)(a).
47. See National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-181 §§ 807-08,
844-46 (codified across various sections of 28 U.S.C.).
48. Id. § 848; 41 U.S.C. § 265(a).
49. 48 C.F.R. §§ 3.909, 24.102(c) (2004).
No. 2]
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C. Corruption
Collaborative governance enhances the prospects for corruption for the sim-
ple reason that it is easier for government to keep tabs on money when it is in its
own budgets as opposed to those of contractors. Indeed, the federal government
seems unable to prevent outsourcing to some 70,000 individuals and organizations
on the Excluded Parties List System who are debarred from legally receiving con-
tracts. One listed company received a contract even after it tried to sell nuclear
weapons material to North Korea.
50
Principal-agent theory points to endemic problems in collaborative arrange-
ments. The interests of principals and agents are not necessarily identical. Agents
may seek larger budgets and more slack than necessary to perform contracted
activities. Information asymmetry usually gives agents an advantage over prin-
cipals, who may make poor choices in partnering adverse selection. 51 Inadequate
monitoring by principals also can foster moral hazards among agents. As princip-
als take measures to counter these potential problems, contracts become more
complex and costly to implement and oversee. Matters become even more com-
plex when contractors and subcontractors subcontract, thereby creating attenuated,
nested principal-agent relationships.
The predictive power of principal-agent theory in the context of collaborative
governance is uncertain. By its nature, the full extent of corruption that can be
attributed either to principal-agent relationships or other aspects of collaboration is
unknowable. However, enough cases have attracted governmental and media
attention to indicate that outsourcing creates significant opportunities for corrup-
tion.52
IV. AN ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE ACT FOR THE COLLABORATIVE
GOVERNANCE STATE?
In 1946, the APA was hailed as "a bill of rights for the hundreds of thousands
of Americans whose affairs are controlled or regulated in one way or another by
agencies of the Federal Government." 53 The Act was aimed at democratizing
federal administrative processes. 54 Along with the Legislative Reorganization Act
of 1946, the APA improved Congress' ability to control and monitor federal agen-
cies. After six decades and many amendments and augmentations, the Act is still
the generic regulatory law of federal administrative practice. However, as gov-
ernment changes to governance, the APA becomes less relevant because, as noted
50. Robert Brodsky, Government Continues To Provide Unethical Contractors with Work, GAO
Says, GOV'T EXECUTIVE, Feb. 26. 2009, available at http://www.govexec.com/story-page.cfm?
filepath=/dailyfed/0209/022609rbl.htm&oref=search; U.S. GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE,
EXCLUDED PARTIES LIST SYSTEM: SUSPENDED AND DEBARRED BUSINESSES AND INDIVIDUALS
IMPROPERLY RECEIVE FEDERAL FUNDS (2009), available at http://www.gao.gov/new.items
d09174.pdf.
51. JEAN-JAQUES LAFFONT & DAVID MARTIMORT, THE THEORY OF INCENTIVES: THE PRINCIPAL-
AGENT MODEL (2002).
52. A Google search of "corruption in federal contracting" yields 971,000 results.
53. 92 CONG. REC. 2140, 2149 (1946) (statement of Sen. McCarran).
54. DAVID ROSENBLOOM, BUILDING A LEGISLATIVE-CENTERED PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION:
THE CONGRESS AND THE ADMINISTRATIVE STATE, 1946-1999, at 35-41 (2000).
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earlier, it does not reach the vast majority of contractor activity. This creates an
anomaly. Identical work paid for with taxpayer and deficit dollars is subordinated
to administrative law when performed by government but not when contracted out
to third parties. If freedom of information, extensive transparency and procedural
due process are important in government, why aren't they important when con-
tractors do government's work? The revenue sources and work are essentially
indistinguishable. Sometimes contractors and government employees work side-
by-side, performing the same functions under radically different legal regimes. If
public employees have broad constitutional rights to freedom of speech, 5 associa-
tion, privacy, and procedural due process, what is the rationale for not guarantee-
ing the same rights to individuals working for private entities when paid with
federal contracting dollars?
The short answer, of course, is that subjecting contractors to administrative
law and constitutional values will raise costs and defeat the purpose of outsourc-
ing. However, as noted above, outsourcing has several purposes. Few would
complain if the state-action doctrine defeated an administrative agency's effort to
circumvent "the most solemn obligations imposed by the Constitution"6--or,
perhaps, if transparency regulations served as a check on outsourcing for political
gain. If outsourcing is primarily aimed as subsidizing favored interests, perhaps
imposing administrative law and constitutional values on collaborators would be a
reasonable quid pro quo. For instance, as a condition of the contract, a religious
organization paid by government to perform outsourced government work could
be barred from firing the employees involved for reasons, such as sexual orienta-
tion, that would be unacceptable in public agencies. 57 Under some circumstances,
imposing higher costs on contractors may make collaboration more politically and
legally acceptable, as in prison administration where constitutional law and public
values demand that prisoners have at least "the minimal civilized measure of life's
necessities. 58
The immediate problem, of course, is that drafting an APA for collaborative
governance would be no mean task. Such a law would have to balance the com-
peting values between government and governance as well as among the multiple
purposes for collaborating. There is a further complication: to be effective, it
would also have to be based on a model of how public administration inside gov-
ernment should operate in the collaborative administrative state.
V. AN ADMINISTRATIVE CULTURE CHANGE FOR THE COLLABORATIVE
GOVERNANCE STATE?
Administrative culture refers to the values that inform administrative ar-
rangements and administrators' behavior. Moving from one administrative state
to another requires culture change. As the U.S. public administrative orthodoxy
of the 1930s and 1940s gave way to more democratized administration beginning
in the 1960s, administrative practices were continually reshaped to accept, if not
55. Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410,417-418 (2006).
56. Lebron v. Nat'l R.R. Passenger Corp., 513 U.S. 374, 397 (1995).
57. See Norton v. Macy, 417 F.2d 1161 (D.C. Cir. 1969).
58. Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 347 (1981).
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embrace, transparency, public participation, and procedural due process. 59 Ad-
ministrators were required to work in more socially representative and culturally
diverse workforces. These changes were often difficult and spurred considerable
litigation. For instance, every agency that testified on the federal Freedom of
Information Act of 1966 apparently opposed it, 6I and promoting equal opportunity
employment in the civil service proved to be a long-term struggle. 62 Nevertheless,
by the mid-1970s, in terms of democratic-constitutional values, legislative over-
sight, and judicial involvement, U.S. public administration would have been al-
most unrecognizable to advocates of the orthodoxy of the 1930s.
What changes do we need in administrative culture today to facilitate the col-
laborative governance state?
Adjust Administrative Structures and Processes. Centralized and
hierarchical structures need to be adjusted in response to relation-
ships and interactions with partners. 63 An increasing use of net-
works involving citizen groups and the non-profit and private sectors
in a more parallel and horizontal structure would encourage more
partners to participate in collaboration. 64 Quasi-legislative and qua-
si-judicial processes that encourage collaboration 65 should be consi-
dered for incorporation in administrative decision-making and im-
plementation. In addition, procedural inflexibility and red tape
usually frustrate partners and undermine the development of collabo-
ration and, consequently, should be reduced. Allowing administra-
tors more discretion can promote more creative and tailored solu-
tions to the needs of partners in collaboration.
66
" Improve Government-Citizen Trust. Lack of trust between govern-
ment agencies and other partners is one of the main impediments to
collaboration. Trust-building is a starting point for collaboration.
67
To develop citizens' trust in government, administrators must listen
59. See ROSENBLOOM, supra note 54; DAVID H. ROSENBLOOM, ROBERTS. KRAVCHUK, & RICHARD
M. CLERKIN, PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION: UNDERSTANDING MANAGEMENT, POLITICS, AND LAW IN THE
PUBLIC SECTOR 466-506 (7th ed. 2008) (1986); DAVID H. ROSENBLOOM & ROSEMARY O'LEARY,
PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION AND LAW (2d ed. 1997) (1983).
60. See ROSENBLOOM & O'LEARY, supra note 59.
61. See SUBCOMMITFEE ON ADMIN. PRACTICE & PROCEDURE OF THE SENATE COMM. ON THE
JUDICIARY, FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT SOURCE BOOK: LEGISLATIVE MATERIALS, CASES,
ARTICLES (1974).
62. See DAVID H. ROSENBLOOM, FEDERAL EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY: POLITICS
AND PUBLIC PERSONNEL ADMINISTRATION (1977).
63. Cheryl Simrell King et al., The Question of Participation: Toward Authentic Participation in
Public Administration, 58 PUB. ADMIN. REV. 317, 320 (1998).
64. See STEPHEN GOLDSMITH & WILLIAM D. EGGERS, GOVERNING BY NETWORK: THE NEW
SHAPE OF THE PUBLIC SECTOR (2004).
65. See Lisa B. Bingham et al., The New Governance: Practices and Processes for Stakeholder and
Citizen Participation in the Work of Government, 65 PUB. ADMIN. REV. 547 (2005).
66. Julia M. Wondolleck & Steven L. Yaffee, MAKING COLLABORATION WORK: LESSONS
FROM INNOVATION IN NATURAL RESOURCE MANAGEMENT 221 (2000).
67. David P. McCaffrey et al., The Appeal and Difficulties of Participative Systems, 6
ORGANIZATION SCIENCE 603, 612 (1995), available at http://www.jstor.org/stable/2635025.
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and be responsive.68 Communication between administrators with
authority and expertise and citizens with local knowledge is essential
in producing positive collaborative outcomes. Administrators' lack
of trust in citizens and failure to consider local knowledge can result
in government decisions that are inappropriate for the particular de-
mands and situations of the other participants in a collaborative rela-
tionship.
69
Develop New Skills to Manage Collaboration. The skills required to
work in a hierarchical structure are not suitable for work in a more
horizontal structure that emphasizes communication and negotiating
with different collaborative partners. Administrators face the mul-
tiple and diverse interests, perspectives, and expectations of their
partners70 and have to learn how to manage and facilitate collabora-
tion. Identifying opportunities and priorities for collaboration is es-
sential because collaboration takes time and effort. 7' Dr. Lester M.
Salamon72 discusses activation skills, orchestration skills, and mod-
ulations skills.7 3 Activation skills refer to the skills to identify, at-
tract, and encourage entities to join collaborative efforts with gov-
ernment and other partners. Orchestration skills emphasize adminis-
trators' ability to develop visions and consensus, enhance coordina-
tion, and persuade partners to remain in collaborative arrangements.
Modulation skills require administrators to design and implement a
combination of rewards and penalties to guide and motivate partners
to achieve desirable outcomes. Agranoff and McGuire discuss acti-
vating, framing, mobilizing, and synthesizing.74 Increasing training
in such skills is necessary to make collaborative governance more ef-
fective.
" Adjust Personal Attitudes and Organizational Values. Collaboration
requires sharing resources and authority and changes in administra-
tive routines, which usually clash with the principles and experiences
68. Camilla Stivers, The Listening Bureaucrat: Responsiveness in Public Administration, 54 PUB.
ADMIN. REV. 364, 364 (1994).
69. MICHELLE W. SIMMONS, PARTICIPATION AND POWER: Civic DISCOURSE IN ENVIRONMENTAL
POLICY DECISIONS 91-93 (2007).
70. Edward P. Weber & Anne M. Khademian, Wicked Problems, Knowledge Challenges and Colla-
borative Capacity Builders in Network Settings, 68 PUB. ADMIN. REV. 334, 341 (2008).
71. Mary Belefski, Collaboration at the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency: An Interview with
Two Senior Managers, 66 PUB. ADMIN. REV. 143, 144 (2006) (Special Issue on Collaborative Public
Management).
72. Dr. Salamon is Director of the Johns Hopkins University Center for the Study of Civil Society, a
member of the U.S. National Academy of Public Administration, and a leading scholar on collabora-
tive governance involving nonprofit organizations.
73. See Lester M. Salamon, The New Governance and the Tools of Public Action: An Introduction,
in THE TOOLS OF GOVERNMENT: A GUIDE TO GOVERNANCE (Lester M. Salamon & O.V. Elliot
eds., 2002).
74. Robert Agranoff & Michael McGuire, Big Questions in Public Network Management Research,
11 J. PUB. ADMIN. RESEARCH & THEORY 295,298-300 (2001).
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of administrators. 75 Collaboration may pose a threat to individual
administrators and agencies, making them uncomfortable with or
even resistant to collaborative efforts.7 6 The administrative stereo-
types of citizens as lacking ability and expertise and the fear that col-
laboration will reduce efficiency and damage agencies' reputations
discourage administrators from investing fully in collaboration.
Administrators need a better understanding of the possibilities and
benefits of collaboration and to develop a passion and commitment
for it.77 Organizational cultures should trust and encourage adminis-
trators to share power with their partners and invest time and re-
sources in collaboration.
Enhance Accountability through Assessment of Collaborative Out-
comes. Administrators face a dilemma in collaboration: they do not
have control over the actions of their partners but are nevertheless
responsible for the collective outcomes. Evaluating new collabora-
tive efforts based on traditional standards and procedures frustrates
and discourages future collaborative efforts. From a network pers-
pective, new standards used to assess collaboration should focus on
the capacity to create conditions favorable to collaboration, to coope-
rate with partners, and develop solutions using networks. 78 Thomas
Beierle and Jerry Cayford suggest evaluation based on five social
goals: incorporating public values into decisions; improving the
substantive quality of decisions; resolving conflicts among compet-
ing interests; building trust in institutions; and educating and inform-
ing the public.
79
" Enhance Accountability through Assessment of Collaborative
Process. Administrators are held accountable for the ways in which
they implement their functions and achieve outcomes. Methods for
assessing collaborative processes are necessary. William D. Leach
emphasizes inclusiveness; representativeness; impartiality; transpa-
rency; deliberativeness; lawfulness; and empowerment. 80 Daniel Fi-
orino suggests four democratic criteria: direct participation of ama-
teurs; collective decision-making; face-to-face discus-
sion/deliberation; and equality.
81
75. King, et. al, supra note 63, at 323.
76. Richard Gardner & Ron Shaffer, The National Rural Development Partnership in the United
States: A Case Study in Collaboration, in PARTICIPATORY GOVERNANCE: PLANNING, CONFLICT
MEDIATION AND PUBLIC DECISION-MAKING IN CIVIL SOCIETY 61, 77 (W. Robert Lovan, Michael
Murray, & Ron Shaffer, eds. 2004).
77. Weber & Khademian, supra note 70, at 343-44.
78. Paul L. Posner, Accountability Challenges of Third Party Government, in THE TOOLS OF
GOVERNMENT 523, 546 (Lester Salamon ed., 2002).
79. THOMAS BEIRLE & JERRY CAYFORD, DEMOCRACY IN PRACTICE: PUBLIC PARTICIPATION IN
ENVIRONMENTAL DECISIONS 6 (2002).
80. William D. Leach, Collaborative Public Management and Democracy: Evidence from Western
Watershed Partnerships, 66 PUB. ADMIN. REV. 100, 100 (2006).
81. Daniel J. Fiorino, Citizen Participation and Environmental Risk: A Survey of Institutional Me-
chanisms, 15 SC. TECH. & HUM. VALUES 226, 229-230 (1990), available at http://www.jstor.org/
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" Increase Bureaucratic Representativeness. In collaboration, admin-
istrators must work with people from diverse parts of society and
with different values, cultures, and perspectives. Partners care about
with whom they work, just as they care about who delivers servic-
es. Making administrators more socially representative may not di-
rectly result in more positive outcomes in collaborative efforts, but it
will help to increase administrative legitimacy as well as citizens'
trust in government and their perception of its accessibility. 83 Re-
presentativeness can also increase administrators' understanding,
sensibility, and ability to work with people with different needs and
values.
" Increase Institutional Support for Collaboration. Top-level agency
commitment is necessary if collaboration is to succeed." Collabora-
tion requires repeated communication, negotiation, and network-
building over time. It takes time and effort and requires top-level of-
ficials' consistent support to secure funding and personnel for colla-
borative efforts. The discontinuation of funding and changes in per-
sonnel hurt the development and sustainability of collaborative ef-
forts. 85 Transitions in administration or changes in political appoin-
tees challenge administrators who have to develop relationships with
new appointees and convince them of the value of collaboration.
86
" Be Aware of the Dark Side of Collaboration. Imbalance of power
and resources among partners is common. 87 Administrators need to
be aware that this potentially affects the interaction between partners
and collaborative outcomes. 88 As noted earlier, collaborative efforts
can be used to suppress the demands and interest of less powerful
stable/689860?seq=l (Mr. Fiorino is Director, National Environmental Performance Track Program,
U.S. Environmental Protection Agency and Executive in Residence in the Department of Public Ad-
ministration and Policy, American University-Washington, D.C.).
82. See Gregory S. Thielman & Joseph Stewart, Jr., A Demand-Side Perspective on the Importance
of Representative Bureaucracy: Aids, Ethnicity, Gender, and Sexual Orientation, 56 PUB. ADMIN.
REV. 168 (1996).
83. Nicholas 0. Alozie & Cherise G. Moore, Blacks and Latinos in City Management: Prospects
and Challenges in Council Governments, 30 INT'L J. PUB. ADMIN. 47, 50 (2007).
84. W. Robert Lovan, Regional Transportation Strategies in the Washington, D.C. Area: When Will
They Be Ready to Collaborate?, in PARTICIPATORY GOVERNANCE: PLANNING, CONFLICT
MEDIATION AND PUBLIC DECISION-MAKING IN CIVIL SOCIETY 115, 115-128 (W. Robert Lovan,
Michael Murray, & Ron Shaffer, eds. 2004).
85. WONDOLLECK & YAFFEE, supra note 66, at 57.
86. U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, TOWARDS AN ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE COLLABORATIVE MODEL:
AN EVALUATION OF THE USE OF PARTNERSHIPS TO ADDRESS ENVIRONMENTAL ISSUES IN
COMMUNITIES 16 (2003), available at http;//www.epa.gov/evaluate/ejevalrpt.pdf.
87. Sheila Foster, Environmental Justice in An Era of Devolved Collaboration, 26 HARV. ENVTL.
L. REV. 459,494 (2002).
88. See Laurence J. O'Toole & K.J. Meier, Desperately Seeking Selznick: Cooptation and the Dark
Side of Public Management in Networks, 64 PUB. ADMIN. REV. 681 (2004).
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groups, 89 to conduct illegal or unethical activities, or lead to gov-
ernment corruption. 9 1
VI. CONCLUSION: INTEGRATING THE COLLABORATIVE GOVERNANCE
STATE INTO U.S. CONSTITUTIONAL DEMOCRACY
If the collaborative governance state continues to progress, substantial
changes in administrative law and culture are inevitable. In the past, each time
U.S. public administration underwent a paradigm shift, the values embedded in
administration changed dramatically. Beginning in the 1880s, so did the statutory
law governing administrative structure and behavior. 92 Since the 1960s, a great
deal of legislative and judicial effort has been devoted to retrofitting the adminis-
trative state into the U.S. constitutional regime. 93 In the process, Congress and the
federal courts gained substantial leverage over administrative processes, values,
and outcomes. Collaborative governance presents new challenges for integrating
public administration and constitutional democracy.
Currently, those challenges are being met-if at all-incrementally. Incre-
mentalism has many virtues. 9 However, guiding principles help avoid missteps.
The APA and contemporary constitutional law supply many of those principles.
If transparency, public participation and representation, and procedural due
process and a broad array of other constitutional rights for individuals in their
encounters with public administration are important for democratizing the re-
ceived administrative state, their significance for the collaborative governance
state cannot be gainsaid. OMB's Circular A-76 places no value on freedom of
information, constitutional rights, and other democratic-constitutional concerns in
structuring competitive sourcing. 95  That may be reasonable if transparency,
rights, and such concerns have no value, but it is irrational to cede such considera-
tions by default. Consequently, the daunting nature of the task notwithstanding,
serious deliberation should be given to developing an administrative law regime
and culture that are mutually supportive and effective in preserving the democrat-
ic-constitutional values and process that have been forced into public administra-
tion over the past six decades.
89. See DOUGLASJ. AMY, THE POLITICS OF ENVIRONMENTAL MEDIATION (1987).
90. Jbrg Raab & Briton Milward, Dark Networks as Problems, 13 J. PUB. ADMIN. RES. & THEORY
413,414-415 (2003).
91. Jin-Wook Choi, Governance Structure and Administrative Corruption in Japan: An Organiza-
tional Network Approach, 67 PUB. ADMIN. REV. 930 (2007).
92. See DAVID H. ROSENBLOOM, FEDERAL SERVICE AND THE CONSTITUTION 70-118 (1971); David
H. Rosenbloom, Administrative Law and Regulation, in HANDBOOK OF PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION 635,
654-661 (Jack Rabin, W. Bartley Hidlreth, & Gerald Miller, eds., Taylor & Francis 3d ed. 2007).
93. See ROSENBLOOM & O'LEARY, supra note 59.
94. Charles Lindblom, The Science of Muddling Through, 19 PUB. ADMIN. REV. 79, 86 (1959),
available at http://www.emerginghealthleaders.ca/resources/Lindblom-Muddling.pdf.
95. OMB CIRCULAR NO. A-76, supra note 13.
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